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THE CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND: 
NEW FACT-FINDING POWERS FOR 
THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 
Richard L. Perryt and William Simon* 
THE complexity, scope and length of modem antitrust litigation bring to prominence the procedures by which evidence -
particularly documentary evidence - is discovered and placed be-
fore the courts and administrative agencies. Fact-finding mechan-
isms now available for ferreting out and prosecuting violations 
make up an imposing array. These include the grand jury sub-
poena, the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil and 
Criminal Procedure and the subpoena and visitorial powers of 
certain administrative agencies. The "civil investigative demand," 
a precomplaint compulsory process, is a new weapon proposed 
to be added to this arsenal. 
Few dispute the desirability of new precomplaint investiga-
tive authority in civil antitrust cases. Legislation passed by the 
Senate during the First Session of the 86th Congress, however, 
is apparently designed to attain objectives in addition to precom-
plaint investigation. In so doing, it may infringe constitutional 
safeguards erected for the protection of private papers as well as 
safeguards designed to achieve an impartial administration of 
justice. 
Background 
For several years the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice has sought power to issue "civil investigative demands" to 
obtain data needed in deciding whether to file a civil antitrust 
complaint. Before complaint the department can, and usually 
does, seek the voluntary cooperation of persons under investiga-
tion, and this method has proved satisfactory in many cases.1 
The grand jury, which is available only where there are grounds 
for believing that a criminal violation has occurred, is not a sat-
t Member, District of Columbia Bar.-Ed. 
• Member, District of Columbia Bar. -Ed. 
l REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMrrrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAws 344 (1955) (hereinafter cited as "REPORT"). 
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isfactory alternative.2 Filing complaints on the basis of inade-
quate information and then employing the discovery procedures 
of the federal rules to develop the facts is likewise an unsatisfac-
tory procedure.3 
The only legitimate purpose of a civil investigative demand 
would be to supply information needed to determine whether a 
civil complaint should be brought.4 This need, of course, could be 
met by authority which would permit government investigators 
to inspect and copy relevant documents at the owner's place of 
business. Such authority was embodied in two bills presented to 
the First Session of the 86th Congress: S. 1003, introduced by 
Senator Wiley, and H.R. 4792, introduced by Congressman Geller. 
These bills are identical in all substantial respects. However, the 
bill reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee and passed by 
2In United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 at 683 (1958), the Supreme 
Court said that use of procedures intended for criminal cases to elicit evidence for civil 
cases constitutes "flouting the policy of the law." The district court later found that be-
cause the grand jury had been continued to procure evidence for a civil case after the 
department decided not to ask for an indictment there was "a flouting of the policy of 
the law and a subversion or abuse of the Grand Jury process. . . ." United States v. 
Proctor & Gamble Co., (D.C. N.J. 1959) 175 F. Supp. 198 at 200. 
a Criticism of the vagueness of complaints has been attributed to the inadequacy of 
the department's precomplaint investigative powers. Judicial Conference of the United 
States, "Procedure in Antitrust and Other Protracted Cases," 13 F.R.D. 62 at 67 (1953). 
4 The Department of Justice has no compulsory process in connection with certain 
economic reports made by it, and the proposed civil investigative demand bills, properly 
construed, would not supply such powers. The Attorney General makes reports under 
the Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 798, 50 U.S.C. App. (1958) §2061; the Inter-
state Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas under the Joint Resolution of August 7, 1959, 
73 Stat. 290 (1959); and the Small Business Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 232, as amended, 15 
U.S.C. (1958) §§631-648. The Defense Production Act provides that no act or omission pur-
suant thereto shall be deemed an antitrust violation or a violation of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 64 Stat. 818 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. (1958) §2158. A similar 
provision is found in the Small Business Act [§640 (b)]. The periodic reports under the Com-
pact likewise are not undertaken for the purpose of uncovering specific antitrust violations. 
The civil investigative demand bill, S. 716, is limited to the collection of evidence needed 
for the prosecution of "antitrust violations," and would therefore be unavailable for the 
collection of data required in the preparation of economic reports under the foregoing 
statutes or the <.::ompact. See §2 (c), (d) and (e). Furthermore, the Attorney General is 
authorized by the Defense Production Act to request the Federal Trade Commission to 
conduct surveys in determining factors which may tend to eliminate competition or create 
monopolies, and additional investigative powers would appear to be unneeded. It would 
appear undesirable to give the Attorney General compulsory process in connection with 
these economic reports unless full consideration were given to the implications for industry 
and the administrative process. Such consideration would involve the extent of duplica-
tion and overlap with the jurisdiction of the regulatory agencies, and the desirability of 
clothing the Antitrust Division, which is part of the executive branch, with administrative 
powers which would make it, in effect, an arm of Congress. It is likely that should the 
Attorney General be granted compulsory process to collect economic data not relevant to 
specific law violations, the department could in time largely replace the Federal Trade 
Commission as an expert investigating and fact-finding agency in a number of important 
areas. 
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the Senate, S. 716, introduced by Senator Kefauver, contains 
additional features.5 The Senate's action was surprising, not only 
because S. 716 far exceeds the needs of the department, but also 
because the sweeping powers conferred thereby were not even 
requested.6 
At a Senate subcommittee hearing the only witnesses to ap-
pear were Victor R. Hansen, former head of the Antitrust Divi-
sion, and Earl W. Kintner, then General Counsel and now Chair-
man of the Federal Trade Commission. Frederick H. Mueller, 
then Undersecretary of Commerce, submitted a letter which em-
phasized the need for preserving the confidential character of 
copies of reports submitted to the Department of Commerce. 
Written statements were submitted on behalf of the Section of 
Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association, the Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York, the National Association of 
Manufacturers, and the American Paper and Pulp Association. 
None of these groups favored S. 716. 
S. 716, as approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee, al-
lowed the Attorney General to submit to the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees private documents obtained by means of 
civil investigative demands and did not limit the use thereof by 
such committees. During the floor debate, however, an amend-
ment was adopted which would allow the filing of an applica-
tion in court for a protective order upon notice that such dis-
closures are contemplated.7 
"Documents Custodian" 
S. 716 would create the office of "Documents Custodian" with-
in the Department of Justice with authority to establish and main-
tain a permanent library of private documents or copies thereof.8 
Additional copies could be made by other antitrust agencies and 
other libraries created. Senator Kefauver thus argued in favor 
5 S. 716, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959). See S. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to 
S. Res. 57, on S. 716 and S. 1003, March 3, 1959; S. Rep. 451, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959); 
105 CONG. REc. 13304, 13320, 13323-13333 Guly 29, 1959). 
6 No action was taken during the First Session by the House. 
7 105 CONG. REc. 13328, 13332 Guly 29, 1959). 
s S. 716 requires that business records and other documentary material be turned over 
to a "Documents Custodian,'' to be appointed by the Assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the Antitrust Division. §4 (a). S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 require that the owner make 
documents available to antitrust investigators for inspection and copying but do not create 
the office of "Documents Custodian." §3 (a). 
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of legislation which would permit the Attorney General and Con-
gress to obtain information "even though it might have no par-
ticular importance except for historical reasons."9 
The custodian's office would be staffed by a number of deputy 
custodians and antitrust investigators, all of whom would be 
charged with the responsibility of maintaining voluminous files 
of documents or copies thereof. The budgetary and administra-
tive problems raised by the proposal, which presumably would 
be substantial, were not discussed at the hearing except by Judge 
Hansen, who opposed establishment of the office. He pointed 
out that although the Attorney General's National Committee 
To Study the Antitrust Laws had recommended establishment 
of a documents custodian,10 the department's views were dif-
ferent. He said: 
"The current proposal in S. I 003 provides, as I mentioned, 
for the organization served with a demand to produce the 
material at its principal office or place of business, unless 
otherwise agreed upon by the organization and the Depart-
ment representative. This change [ from the Attorney Gen-
eral's National Committee's recommendation] it seems 
clear, is a considerable improvement. It obviates the burden 
on the Department of becoming a recordkeeping office and 
enables the organization to pursue its normal business ac-
tivities without being deprived of its records."11 
More important than the cost of the new office is the question 
of the propriety of any federal department's undertaking to be-
come a repository for current, private documents in nonregu-
lated industries. Even evidence obtained by grand jury sub-
poena does not become the property of the Department of 
Justice.12 Unless held under an impounding order issued by the 
9 105 CONG. REc. 13329 Guly 29, 1959). 
10 The committee's recommendation was apparently intended to assure that responsi-
bility for the documents should be definitely fixed within the department so as to avoid 
the possibility of unauthorized disclosures. This objective, of course, could easily be 
achieved by providing that each civil investigative demand specify the attorney respon-
sible for safeguarding the documents or copies which are removed. There was no sugges-
tion in the Report that the custodian's function should be to build a permanent library. 
See REPORT 346. 
11 Hearings, note 5 supra, at 13. Later in the hearings, Judge Hansen stated that his 
"number one" objection to the custodian was "that it places an added burden on the De-
partment to maintain a series of records .••• " Id. at 16. 
12 Justice Whittaker, concurring in United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 
677 at 684-685 (1958) said: "The grand jury minutes and transcripts are not the property 
of the Government's attorneys, agents or investigators, nor are they entitled to possession 
of them in such a case. Instead those documents are records of the court. And it seems 
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court, documents and copies thereof must be returned to their 
owner once the grand jury's use of them has ended.13 
The constitutionality of a statute creating a Documents Cus-
todian with power to establish a permanent file of private docu-
ments is dubious. The distinction between papers kept in the 
ordinary course of business and public papers owned by a govern-
ment agency or required to be kept by private persons in aid of 
governmental functions is well recognized.14 Business concerns 
are not required to furnish data to government agencies as to 
their operations unless such data are required in the performance 
of governmental functions.15 Even though an investigative de-
mand were a lawful method of gathering data relevant to a specific 
statutory violation, it does not follow that permanent retention 
of the documents or copies thereof would be legal. If indefinite 
retention were allowed, the documents could be consulted years 
later with respect to alleged violations other than the one which 
prompted the original inquiry, thus depriving a party of notice 
that his activities are under investigation and nullifying the notice 
requirements of the bill itself.16 The indefinite retention of pri-
vate papers raises a question under the Fourth Amendment, which 
states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
clear that where, as here, a 'no true bill' has been voted, their secrecy, which the law 
wisely provides, may be as fully violated by disclosure to and use by the Government 
counsel, agents and investigators as by the defendants' counsel in such a civil suit." 
The government has sometimes conceded that ownership of documents submitted 
pursuant to a grand jury subpoena continues in the person subject to the subpoena. 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., (Crim. No. 2199, N.D. Ind.), transcript Sept. 4, 1959, 
p. 24; application for return of impounded documents denied sub nom. In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, (7th Cir. 1960) 275 F. (2d) 227. 
13 Traub v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 781; Application of Bendix 
Aviation Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1945) 58 F. Supp. 953. As to copies made by the government, 
see United States v. Wallace &: Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793 at 801 (1949) (return of photo-
static copies necessarily follows if the indictment is dismissed); United States v. Proctor & 
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), concurring opinion of Justice Whittaker. But cf. In re 
Petroleum Industry Investigation, (E.D. Va. 1957) 152 F. Supp. 646. After termination of 
the grand jury and any resulting criminal proceedings, copies of documents which could 
have been obtained by means of civil discovery processes may be retained for use in a 
subsequent civil case pursuant to order of the court. Maryland 8e Virginia Milk Producers 
Assn. v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 250 F. (2d) 425. 
14 E.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. I (1948); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 
(1946); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). 
15 Cf. Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 329 U.S. 29 (1946); Valvoline Oil Co. 
v. United States, 308 U.S. 141 (1939); Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 
139 at 146 (1937). 
16 S. 716 requires that notice be given of the nature of the conduct under investiga-
tion, the applicable provision of law, the class or classes of documentary material to be 
submitted, the return date, the identity of the custodian and the place where delivery is 
to be made. §3 (b). 
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houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated .... " 
A question not considered by the subcommittee is who should 
bear the substantial costs involved in making copies of docu-
mentary materials. S. 716 would require that such expenses be 
borne by the owner unless he wishes to do without his records 
altogether.17 Under S. 1003 and H.R. 4792, however, the cost 
of making copies must be borne by the government. These bills 
might help to discourage wholesale demands for documents, or 
"fishing expeditions," because government investigators would 
have to account to their superiors for the costs involved. 
In view of the length of time which the department requires 
to study investigative files before determining whether to file a 
complaint, it would seem only a matter of basic fairness that the 
company under investigation should retain its original business 
records. In the investigative stage of a case, before a complaint 
is filed, the Department of Justice does not need original busi-
ness records. At this stage the right to inspect and copy given by 
S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 should be sufficient.18 
If the civil investigative demand were limited to inspection 
and copying, other problems raised by S. 716 would be reduced. 
For example, business records would not be removed to cities 
distant from the owner's place of business. In addition, the anti-
trust agencies and congressional committees would not be hin-
dered in the exercise of their own subpoena powers by the fact 
that the documents they want had been turned over to the At-
torney General. 
Congressional Committees 
S. 716 delegates power to the Attorney General to supply con-
gressional committees with documentary evidence obtained by 
means of compulsory process whether or not such evidence is 
related to legislative functions.19 For almost eighty years, how-
17 Under S. 716 the government would be required to bear the cost of transporting 
documents to distant cities. §4 (b) (2). 
1s Original business records are possibly not needed even after a grand jury has been 
impaneled or after complaint has been filed. Judge Hansen stated during the hearings 
that photostatic copies are acceptable under the rules of evidence if originals are un-
available. Hearings, note 5 supra, at 19. 
19 S. 716 provides: " •.• nothing herein shall prevent the Attorney General from 
making available the material so produced for examination by the Committee on the 
Judiciary of each House of Congress." §4(c). 
S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 provide: "No documentary material produced pursuant to a 
demand, or copies thereof, shall, unless otherwise ordered by a district court for good 
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ever, the law has been clear that congressional investigations must 
be restricted to legislative purposes.20 The principle was reaf-
firmed as recently as 1957, with the court holding that investiga-
tions unrelated to any legislative purpose are "beyond the powers 
conferred upon the Congress in the Constitution. "21 Since the 
only purpose of the civil investigative demand is to help the At-
torney General obtain documentary evidence for possible litiga-
tion, not legislation, it appears doubtful that such evidence would 
very frequently, if ever, possess a significant relationship to legisla-
tive problems. S. 716 would thus permit the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees to obtain data indirectly, with the coopera-
tion of the Attorney General, which the Constitution does not 
permit them to obtain by means of their own subpoena powers. 
S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 are not subject to the foregoing objec-
tion. Since they are limited to inspection and copying of docu-
ments, congressional committees would remain free to obtain 
documents from the owner by means of subpoena if a legitimate 
legislative purpose is shown. 
Restriction on Discovery Rights 
In civil cases the courts are authorized, upon a showing of 
good cause, to order any party to produce and permit inspection 
and copying of any designated documents, not privileged, in his 
possession, custody or control, if relevant to the issues.22 In 
criminal cases the court may authorize the defendant to inspect 
and copy documents needed for the preparation of his defense, 
including those "obtained from others by seizure or by process."23 
S. 716 restricts the discovery rights of defendants, but not of 
the government, under the federal rules by prohibiting disclosure 
to persons other than government personnel.24 S. 716 com-
pletely forecloses discovery of evidence relevant to the issues of 
a pending case which the custodian has obtained from third parties. 
cause shown, be produced for inspection or copying by, nor shall the contents thereof be 
disclosed to, other than an authorized employee of the Department of Justice, without 
the consent of the organization who produced such material •••• " §4 (a). 
20 Kilborn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). 
21 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 198 (1957). 
22 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 34. 
23 Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 16. 
24 S. 716, in creating a "Documents Custodian," provides: "While in the possession 
of the custodian, no materials so produced shall be available for examination, without the 
consent of the person who produced such material, by any individual other than a duly 
authorized officer, member, or employee of the Department of Justice or any antitrust 
agency •... " §4(c). 
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This is particularly unfair because the custodian can get the ori-
ginal documents. S. 1003 and H.R. 4792, on the other hand, 
attempt to preserve the power of the courts to grant discovery 
under the federal rules of documents obtained by means of civil 
investigative demands upon a showing of "good cause."25 
The problem here involves evidence obtained by the gov-
ernment from third parties. Yet full discovery of all relevant 
evidence is of the greatest importance. Much of the evidence 
in antitrust cases relates to industry questions and involves data 
obtained from persons other than the defendant. Where the 
issue involves an actual or potential injury to competitors, sup-
pliers or customers of the defendant, data obtained from them 
can be an essential feature of the government's or the defendant's 
case. 
The restriction imposed by the Kefauver bill goes against the 
basic policy of the federal rules, stated by the Supreme Court 
in Hickman v. Taylor: 
"The pretrial deposition-discovery mechanism established 
by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the prior 
federal practice, the pretrial functions of notice-giving, issue-
formulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily 
and inadequately by the pleadings. Inquiry into the issues 
and the facts before trial was narrowly confined and was 
often cumbersome in method. The new rules, however, 
restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving 
and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role 
in the preparation for trial. . . . Thus civil trials in the fed-
eral courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The 
way is now clear, consistent ·with recognized privileges, for 
the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the 
issues and facts before trial."26 
Because of the complexity of factual problems commonly en-
countered in antitrust litigation, it is clear that denial of pretrial 
25 S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 provide: "No documentary material produced pursuant to 
a demand, or copies thereof, shall, unless otherwise ordered by a district court for good 
cause shown, be produced for inspection or copying by, nor shall the contents thereof be 
disclosed to [any person], other than an authorized employee of the Department of Jus-
tice, without the consent of the organization who produced such material •... The At-
torney General or any authorized employee of the Department of Justice may use such 
copies of documentary material as he determines necessary in the performance of his official 
duties, including presentation of any case or proceeding before any court or grand jury." 
§4 (a). 
26 329 U.S. 495 at 500-501 (1947). 
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examination and inspection of potential evidence in the govern-
ment's files would cause needless delay and confusion at trial. The 
bill thus reverts to the dark ages of court procedure so far as one 
party, but not the other, in concerned. 
Under S. 716 documents in the possession of the custodian 
would be shrouded in greater secrecy, insofar as pretrial discovery 
is concerned, than even grand jury proceedings. Under the federal 
rules a defendant can obtain discovery of portions of the grand 
jury transcript needed for preparation of the defense upon a show-
ing of good cause.27 
The constitutionality of any statute which would require the 
parties to contend on unequal ground is dubious. The federal 
rules are intended to aid both sides. The broad investigation per-
mitted by the rules can be justified only on the theory that the 
powers granted are mutual.28 
Scope 
S. 716 would be unique in the history of the antitrust laws 
in that it confers investigative power upon the Department of 
Justice extending substantially beyond the department's enforce-
ment jurisdiction.29 S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 are based on the 
principle that the department should not be given a civil inves-
tigative power in any area where it is not authorized to bring a 
civil action. 
27 United States v. Proctor &: Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). 
28 The Supreme Court said in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 at 507 (1947): 
"Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper 
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts 
he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage 
at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, 
thus reducing the possibility of surprise." 
29 S. 716 authorizes investigations of violations of the "antitrust laws" as defined by 
§1 of the Clayton Act and also violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, §3 of 
the Robinson-Patman Act, and "any statute hereafter enacted by the Congress" provid-
ing a civil remedy for restraint or monopolization of commerce or any unfair trade prac-
tice. §2 (a). 
S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 merely authorize investigations of violations of the "antitrust 
laws" as defined by §1 of the Clayton Act. §2 (a). 
Sections II and 15 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
(1958) §§21, 25, confer joint responsibility on the Attorney General and the Federal Trade 
Commission for the enforcement of §§2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act. In addition, the 
Attorney General has enforcement responsibilities under the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 
(1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1958) §4, and he is authorized to enforce the Webb-
Pomerene Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1958) §§61-65, "before the 
Commission has made its investigation." United States Alkali Export Assn. v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 196 at 211 (1945). But the Attorney General has no authority to prosecute 
unfair methods of competition in violation of §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
15 u.s.c. (1958) §45. 
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The danger of unrestricted investigative powers was pointed 
out by the Supreme Court in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. 
Walling: 
"Officious examination can be expensive, so much so that 
it eats up men's substance. It can be time consuming, clog-
ging the processes of business. It can become persecution 
when carried beyond reason."30 
Officious examination is a definite possibility where any of-
ficial is given authority to inquire into matters which have been 
committed to another agency for enforcement purposes. No 
statute has heretofore vested a general inquisitorial power in 
any agency. In the past, Congress has always restricted the power 
of inquiry to the extent reasonably necessary for the performance 
of an agency's assigned responsibilities.31 In United States v. 
Morton Salt Co., the Supreme Court noted: 
"Of course, a governmental investigation into corporate mat-
ters may be of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to 
the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the inves-
tigatory power .... But it is sufficient if the inquiry is 
within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too 
indefinite and the information sought is reasonably rele-
vant."32 
The investigation of violations of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act opens up a new area for the department. Moreover, 
it is an area which until now has been considered to be the special 
responsibility of the Federal Trade Commission. "The Federal 
Trade Commission Act provides a fully-equipped arsenal of wea-
pons for compelling the reluctant to furnish ... information."33 
30 327 U.S. 186 at 213 (1946). 
31 With respect to the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Supreme Court held in 
ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 at 478 (1894): "Neither eranch of the legislative depart-
ment, still less any merely administrative body, established by Congress, possesses, or can 
be invested with, a general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen." 
Even the investigative powers of grand juries are limited to the production of evidence 
needed to fulfill their assigned responsibilities. Thus the Supreme Court held in Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at 77 (1906): " ... some necessity should be shown, either from 
an examination of the witnesses orally, or from the known transactions of these com-
panies with the other companies implicated, or some evidence of their materiality pro-
duced, to justify an order for the production of such a mass of papers." The Federal 
Trade Commission's investigative powers are restricted to the collection of evidence needed 
for adjudicated cases or authorized economic reports. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 
264 U.S. 298 (1924). 
32 338 U.S. 632 at 652 (1950). 
33 Seidman, "The Commission's Powers To Conduct Field Investigations," A.B.A., 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROC. 12 (April 9-10, 1959). 
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Nothing in the subcommittee's report, the hearings or the floor 
debates suggests that the Federal Trade Commission's powers are 
deficient or that the commission has been less than diligent in 
exercising the powers it now has. If any deficiency did exist, 
however, it seems logical that additional investigative authority 
should be conferred upon the commission, not the Attorney Gen-
eral. 
In the absence of any demonstrated need for dual investigative 
powers over offenses created by the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, S. 716 is at best superfluous. More important, the bill would 
create the potentiality of duplicative and overlapping investiga-
tions. The bill provides no machinery for coordinating inves-
tigations by the department with prosecutions by the commis-
sion. Since the department could not bring a complaint under 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, it would almost seem that 
the purpose of S. 716 is to provide a method for surveillance of 
the manner in which the commission discharges its responsibilities 
under the act. 
S. 716 also extends the civil investigative demand to "any 
statute hereafter enacted by the Congress which prohibits, or 
makes available to the United States in any court or antitrust 
agency of the United States any civil remedy with respect to (A) 
any restraint upon or monopolization of interstate or foreign 
trade or commerce, or (B) any unfair trade practice in or af-
fecting such commerce."34 The power to investigate under "any 
statute hereafter enacted" ignores the fact that the investigative 
powers of the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and other agencies have been developed over the years on 
the basis of experience. It appears unwise and potentially pro-
ductive of confused, duplicative and overlapping activities to 
provide in advance the manner by which statutes not yet enacted 
shall be enforced. The objectives of sound legislation should 
require that authority to investigate be given only in the light 
of the problems existing which justify new legislation, the nature 
of the remedies adopted, and the respective capabilities of the 
various enforcement agencies. The attempt to provide the man-
ner for enforcing legislation which may be enacted many years 
hence to meet problems then existing seems premature and be-
yond any need now existing. 
34 Section 2 (a) (4). 
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S. 716 also appears unsound in that it would create a "civil" 
investigative demand to uncover evidence of violation of section 3 
of the Robinson-Patman Act, a criminal statute.35 It is surprising 
that an investigative procedure which arose from objections to the 
use of the grand jury in civil cases should become a means for 
avoiding the grand jury in criminal cases. The Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee said of the Civil Investigative Demand: "It would 
complement, not s11,persede, the grand jury, which retains its 
proper role in criminal investigations."36 
S. 1003 and H.R. 4 792 are somewhat unclear as to whether 
the civil investigative demand could be employed in a criminal 
investigation. It is clear, of course, that no civil investigation 
could be conducted into alleged violations of section 3 of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. But these bills state that the Attorney 
General may execute and issue a civil investigative demand, "prior 
to the institution of a civil or criminal proceeding" upon an "anti-
trust violation,"37 and the term "antitrust violation" is not de-
fined. It is thus conceivable that these bills might be construed 
as permitting employment of the "civil" demand where only 
criminal prosecution is contemplated. There will undoubtedly 
be cases in which evidence of criminality is discovered during 
the course of a civil investigation. In such cases the Attorney Gen-
eral should be authorized to turn over such information to a grand 
jury. Nevertheless, the civil investigative demand should not be 
available under circumstances where, from the outset, only crimi-
nal prosecution is contemplated. 
Notice 
All three bills are deficient in failing to require sufficient 
specificity in the demands with respect to the conduct constituting 
the alleged violation under investigation.38 S. 716 uses the phrase 
"nature of the conduct constituting the alleged antitrust viola-
tion" whereas the other two bills require a statement of "the gen-
eral subject matter of the investigations." Since the purpose of 
35 Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958). 
36 REPORT 347. Emphasis added. 
37 Section 3 (a). 
38 S. 716 provides that the demand shall "(I) state the nature of the conduct con• 
stituting the alleged antitrust violation which is under investigation and the provision of 
law applicable thereto; (2) describe the class or classes of documentary material to be 
produced thereunder with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to 
be fairly identified .... " §3 (b). 
S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 provide that the demand shall: "(1) state the statute and 
section or sections thereof alleged violation of which is under investigation, and the gen• 
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the civil demand is investigatory some latitude in the specification 
of acts, practices and omissions must necessarily be allowed. Never-
theless, because of the possibility that vaguely-worded demands 
may be issued under the quoted language, a more definite standard 
should be adopted. 
S. 716 requires a statement of "the provision of law applicable" 
to the alleged violation, whereas S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 require 
a statement of "the statute and section or sections thereof alleged 
violation of which is under investigation." It is difficult to under-
stand why the Senate adopted the vaguer terminology of S. 716. 
The antitrust laws comprehend a multitude of conceivable of-
fenses, and persons under investigation should be entitled to the 
greatest reasonable measure of specificity. For example, if the 
relationships between two corporations were under investigation 
it might be sufficient under S. 716 to specify that the alleged viola-
tion involved "the Clayton Act." Certainly the parties should be 
entitled to know whether the investigation involves a stock or 
asset acquisition, covered by section 7; an interlocking directorate, 
covered by section 8; or an exclusive dealing arrangement, cov-
ered by section 3. 
All three bills are also deficient in that none requires an identi-
fication of the corporation, association, partnership or individual 
whose conduct is under investigation. It would seem merely a 
matter of basic fairness that the person receiving a civil investiga-
tive demand should be informed whether his own conduct or 
someone else's is under investigation. 
The documents to be furnished in response to a demand should 
be specified with reasonable particularity. For this reason the 
terminology "class or classes" of documents which appears in all 
three bills should be omitted. For example, the following might 
be considered to constitute a "class" of documents: (a) "all cor-
respondence of the Marketing Research Department of your com-
pany for the period 1949-1959," or (b) "all contracts, agreements 
and understandings between your company and .companies A., B. 
and C." Such vague descriptions could easily result in the pro-
duction of documents exceeding the legitimate needs of the in-
vestigation. 
era! subject matter of the investigations; (2) describe the class or classes of documentary 
material to be produced thereunder with reasonable specificity so as fairly to identify 
the material demanded ...• " §3 (b). 
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Delivery of Documents 
S. 716 authorizes the Attorney General to select the place 
where delivery of the documents is to be made.39 Although the 
department requires a measure of flexibility for the efficient per-
formance of its functions, it is difficult to see how any inconveni-
ence would result if government investigators, who are stationed 
throughout the country, were required to inspect the documents 
at the owner's place of business, with the right to make copies if 
needed. S. 716 fails to balance the requirements of efficient ad-
ministration against the potential burdens upon the business com-
munity. For example, the Attorney General could require that 
business records situated in California be produced in Washing-
ton, D.C. or New York City. Moreover, these records could be 
held for several years during the pendency of the investigation and 
any resulting litigation. The California company, if it is to con-
tinue in business, would have to incur substantial expense in 
creating duplicate records. 
S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 are not subject to this objection because 
they are limited to the inspection and copying of documentary 
materials at the owner's place of business. They proceed on the 
principle that the government should bear the costs entailed in 
the performance of governmental functions. 
Petitions To Modify or Set Aside 
Under S. 716, actions to modify or set aside demands must be 
brought in the judicial district where the custodian designated 
therein is located, and the Attorney General is free to select the 
judicial district within which to locate the custodian.40 If S. 716 
were construed as authorizing a separate custodian for each de-
mand, forum shopping could become a serious problem. Thus, 
a company whose principal office is in Maine might be required 
to litigate in California, 3000 miles from its headquarters. A 
company in Florida could become involved in Oregon.41 S. I 003 
39 Section 3 (b). S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 provide that documentary material shall be 
produced for inspection and copying during normal business hours at the principal office 
and place of business of the organizations or at such other times and places as may be 
agreed upon by the parties. §3 (a), (h). 
40 Section 5 (b). 
41 The following statement of factors considered by the courts in ruling upon venue 
questions is worth considering in connection with the place where actions should be 
brought. United States v. National City Lines, 7 F.R.D. 393 at 398 (1947): "Courts have 
held that the indictment of a person away from his domicile which requires him to 
(1) go to a distant place, (2) employ counsel in a distant city and (3) to bring his wit-
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and H.R. 4792 eliminate the possibility of forum shopping and 
m1mmize the burden on the company concerned.42 
Disclosure of Confidential Data 
Data obtained by means of a civil investigative demand should 
not be disclosed to government officials other than Department 
of Justice personnel except in connection with court or grand jury 
proceedings. Nevertheless, S. 716 permits disclosures to congres-
sional committees and various federal agencies.43 S. 1003 and 
H.R. 4792, on the other hand, do not authorize such disclosures.44 
The problem of protecting confidential information from un-
authorized disclosure is a serious one under S. 716 because such 
information may be furnished to many people outside the depart-
ment.45 Moreover, the bill contains no prohibition against dis-
closures by persons who acquire access to the documents. Agencies 
like the Federal Trade Commission, on the other hand, are not 
authorized to divulge confidential information to anyone outside 
the commission.46 
In a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee John W. 
Gwynne, former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, 
nesses from afar are hardships to be considered. So is also, in the case of a corporate body, 
the fact that (4) its business headquarters are in another city, and (5) its records are there. 
42 S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 provide that the petition shall be filed "in the United 
States district court for the district in which the principal office or place of business 
of the organization upon whom such demand was served is located, or in such other 
district as the parties may agree." §5 (b). 
43 S. 716 permits disclosures to the Senate and House Judiciary committees and to 
"antitrust agencies." §§2 (b), 4 (c). No demand shall contain any requirement which 
would be held "unreasonable" or require the production of any documentary material which 
would be privileged from disclosure if such requirement were contained in a grand jury 
subpoena. §3 (c). Upon notice that the documents are to be submitted to an antitrust 
agency or congressional committee, the owner may petition the district court for an order 
for the protection of "secret processes, developments, research or any privileged material . 
• • • " §5 (e). 
44 S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 prohibit disclosures to other than authorized personnel of 
the Department of Justice except in connection with any case or proceeding before a 
court or grand jury. §4 (a). 
45 Judge Hansen explained the problem as follows, Hearings, note 5 supra, at 20: 
" .•. each time that someone else has an opportunity to see the documents, the per-
sonal records or private records of a corporation, the more difficult it is to get those 
records or to see the records, and I am sure there are instances where it would be difficult 
for someone not a part of the company or not in the particular industry to readily 
identify whether it constituted confidential matter or trade secrets or not. Just looking 
at it to me might not mean anything particularly. To somebody in the industry it would. 
·we would have considerable problems." 
46 Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 721 (1914), as amended, 
15 U.S.C. (1958) §46 (f) prohibits disclosure of "trade secrets and names of customers" to 
other than commission personnel. Section 10 provides that officers and employees of the 
commission shall be subject to fine and imprisonment for making public "any informa-
tion obtained by the commission .•.. " 
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stated that the commission was opposed to provisions which would 
prevent disclosures to the commission. "Such a prohibition," he 
said, "would completely disrupt the current cooperative practices 
of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
to exchange information with each other and to allow the other 
to inspect, copy, and use evidence other than that secured by grand 
jury subpoena."47 Mr. Gwynne's view, however, seems to ignore 
the distinction between documents obtained by the department 
through voluntary cooperation and documents obtained by means 
of compulsory process. His letter recognizes that information ob-
tained by grand jury subpoena is not a subject of the cooperative 
arrangements between the department and the commission. 
If the civil investigative demand were limited to the inspec-
tion and copying of documents, no interference with the fact-
finding processes of the Federal Trade Commission or any other 
agency would result. Because the original documents would be 
retained by the owner thereof, the commission would remain free 
to discover through exercise of its own powers facts needed in the 
enforcement of the laws entrusted to it. 
There could be no objection to a provision allowing the De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to ex-
change information as to current or planned investigations. The 
need to avoid duplicative and overlapping activities appears to 
require this conclusion. This, however, stops short of an inter-
change of documents obtained by means of the separate and dis-
tinct powers of the department and the commission. 
Expiration of Demands 
S. 716 provides that the o,mer of documents produced pur-
suant to a demand may call for their return "within a reasonable 
time after completion of the examination and analysis of all evi-
dence assembled in the course of such investigation .... "48 In 
addition, the bill permits copies to be retained indefinitely by the 
Department of Justice or any "antitrust agency."49 The bill, in 
allowing the documents to be retained for the duration of the 
investigation regardless of whether it is conducted within a reason-
able time, is in sharp contrast to grand jury procedures. Thus 
section 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
that no grand jury may serve more than eighteen months. Since 
47 Hearings, note 5 supra, at 24. 
48 Section 4 (f). 
49 Section 4 (c), (e), (f). 
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one of the purposes of the civil investigative demand was to pro-
vide a more efficient and expeditious fact-finding procedure than 
the grand jury, it is surprising that legislation should make it 
possible for civil investigations to drag out longer than grand jury 
proceedings. The maximum duration of any investigation should 
be no more than eighteen months, and all documents should 
be returned thereafter. 
S. 1003 and H.R. 4792 provide that the owner of the docu-
ments shall be relieved of the duty of holding them available in 
connection with the investigation or any proceeding resulting 
therefrom or at the end of eighteen months, whichever is the soon-
er. The district courts, however, are authorized to extend the 
period of eighteen months.150 This provision could be improved 
by making it clear that all copies of documentary materials, as well 
as the originals, must be returned when the demand expires. 
Penal Provisions 
The Attorney General's Committee recommended that the civil 
investigative demand should be enforced by appropriate order of 
the court and not by penal sanction.151 All three current proposals, 
however, contain penal provisions.152 
These provisions appear unnecessary because the courts have 
ample power to compel compliance with their orders, and exist-
ing legislation provides criminal penalties for furnishing false in-
formation to the government.53 It is entirely possible that the 
penal provisions could result in uneven and unfair enforcement 
of the demand. For example, if a party had no intention of com-
plying with the demand unless and until ordered by court, would 
he be guilty of crime for willfully ",;vithholding" the documents? 
The penal provisions thus create the possibility that a person hav-
ing a legitimate objection to the propriety of a demand must run 
the risk of subjecting himself to a criminal charge merely by stand-
ing on his rights and awaiting an appropriate court order before 
he complies.154 
150 Section 4 (b). 
151 REPORT 347. 
152 All three bills provide for a $5,000.00 fine and imprisonment for not more than 
five years for anyone who "willfully removes from any place, conceals, withholds, destroys, 
mutilates, alters, or by any other means falsifies any documentary material .•.• "§6. 
15818 U.S.C. (1958) §1001 provides for a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for not 
more than five years for persons who willfully falsify, conceal, cover up or make any 
false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation to any department or agency of 
the United States. Id., §401 authorizes the courts to punish contempts of court by fine 
or imprisonment. 
154 Section 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 723 (1914), as amended, 
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Conclusion 
The civil investigative demand could be made a useful mechan-
ism for gathering evidence of civil antitrust violations. It would 
replace the grand jury for precomplaint investigations where there 
are no grounds for believing a criminal violation has occurred. 
For this purpose it would be sufficient to permit government in-
vestigators, subject to judicial safeguards, to inspect relevant docu-
ments at the owner's place of business. The appointment of a 
"Documents Custodian" in the Antitrust Division to maintain 
permanent files of private documents is not only unnecessary but 
also undesirable in several respects. (1) The bill passed by the 
Senate, S. 716, would permit the custodian to remove records to 
distant cities, and in some cases would require that litigation with 
respect to the propriety of a demand be conducted outside the 
judicial district where the owner of the documents maintains his 
principal office. (2) The use of documents should be strictly 
limited to the purposes of the investigation. Their contents 
should not be disclosed to congressional committees or administra-
tive agencies with no direct interest in the subject of the investiga-
tion. (3) Third party documents should be left subject to the dis-
covery provisions of the federal rules after a lawsuit has been 
started. (4) The Attorney General should not be given authority 
to investigate violations of statutes he has no power to enforce by 
means of a civil action. Authority to investigate violations of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act and section 3 of the Robinson-
Patman Act should therefore be eliminated from the bill. 
Although the Geller and Wiley bills, H.R. 4792 and S. 1003, 
could be improved in several respects, they are radically different 
from S. 716 and therefore provide a better start toward civil in-
vestigative demand legislation. 
15 U.S.C. (1958) §50 provides criminal penalities for persons who "neglect or refuse to 
attend and testify . . . or to produce documentary evidence . . ." or who "willfully 
remove out of the jurisdiction of the United States, or willfully mutilate, alter, or by 
any other means falsify any documentary evidence .... " Since it would be uncon-
stitutional to require an investigatee to subject himself to criminal penalties in order 
to test the lawfulness of a commission subpoena, he may bring an action to enjoin en• 
forcement. FTC v. Millers' National Federation, (D.C. Cir. 1927) 23 F. (2d) 968. What 
was described as "the first successful criminal prosecution for failure to give testimony 
at hearings before a Federal regulatory agency in response to a subpoena" was recently 
concluded, on April 13, 1960, by means of a guilty plea and imposition of the minimum 
fine. United States v. Freeman, (Crim. No. 59CR213, N.D. Ill. 1960). See FTC Press Re-
lease, April 22, 1960. If criminal sanctions have any place in a civil investigative demand 
bill, it should be made clear that they do not come into operation until procedures for 
civil enforcement have been carried to a conclusion. 
